Turkey's referendum is blow to protection of minority rights, international politics researcher says

LAWRENCE — International election monitors have heavily criticized Turkish election officials for their conduct in the weekend referendum that granted exclusive powers to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

A University of Kansas researcher of international relations who grew up in Turkey said some last-minute tactics likely played into Erdogan's hands and that the results threaten hope for a liberal democratic system in Turkey.

Nazli Avdan, assistant professor of political science, is available to discuss the fallout of the referendum. Her broad research focus includes international migration and international relations. She has published articles in the Journal of Public Policy, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly and European Union Politics about issues surrounding border controls and how countries control their own visa processes, human trafficking and how asylum recognition rates in Europe respond to terrorism.

Q: What is the most significant takeaway from the results as they stand right now?

Avdan: In my opinion, it is the final nail in the coffin of any shred of hope for a liberal democratic system based on the rule of law. I also personally think that referendums often pave the path to the tyranny of the majority, which is what democracy can turn into, unfortunately — and turn into almost overnight. The results as well as the abject intimidation of the "no" camp preceding the election also draw into sharper relief the polarization and fragmentation of Turkish society. Albeit, the outcome is now one that ruthlessly suppresses the "other half," so to speak — the despised "old establishment," Kurds, non-Sunni minorities, Kemalists and some in the liberal camp.

Q: Can anything change based on the criticism from international election monitors?

Avdan: The election results are contested, not just due to suspected fraud but due to an unconventional last-minute decision to count unstamped votes as well. Some suggest that this unduly played into the hands of the "yes" camp, and I would agree. 

Nonetheless, I have no doubt that the election results are valid and will stand. They are legal, but the legitimacy of the vote rests on shaky grounds. The margin of victory is narrow, even if we were to assume all procedures were kosher. 

Q: What likely will happen now in Turkey if the referendum stands?

Avdan: What follows is a gradual transition by 2019 into an executive-dominated presidential system. It is by design devoid of checks and balances, though the Erdogan camp argues otherwise. It was touted from its inception as a Turkic-style presidential system that is first of its kind in how much authority it vests in the executive. 

It was a long time in the making, and, without doubt, the failed coup attempt of July 15 coupled with the spate of terrorist incidents that Turkey has suffered, perpetrated by the Islamic State and PKK and affiliates, all of which empowered the yes camp. The result further entrenches Erdogan's powers and also legitimizes the de facto one-man rule that Turkey is already typified by. Ever since Erdogan assumed the presidency in 2014, he was the de facto head of state.

For domestic policy, I fear a transition from illiberal democracy to an illiberal anocracy or autocracy. This was a trend that was already in place even prior to the coup but had gained force with the coup attempt. Now there are fewer obstacles in Erdogan's path for razing minority rights and further curtailing civil liberties. 

As for foreign policy, I do not anticipate a significant or sharp reversal. This is also a long time in the making process that has accelerated of late. The AKP, or Justice and Development Party, made an overt bid to revive the European project during their first two terms in power — in the 2000s. They changed course post-2010 and increasingly and more publicly have disavowed the European project. I will add here that it takes two to tango: The EU project had stalled for a few years, and the public — even those who voted no — saw full membership as a pipe’s dream. I think the ultimate outcome will be a formal withdrawal from European Union candidacy. Re-establishing capital punishment would, of course, make this a moot point.

Some speculate that he'll now embark on a public campaign to patch up relations with the West, particularly with European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands. They base these claims on the fact that his victory speech was quite humble. I disagree. He has no need to do this given that regional dominance undergirds his foreign policy agenda. As a disclaimer, this is partially rhetoric in the sense that for all the grandstanding against the West, I do not foresee a complete disentanglement from Western alliance systems. However, there is a genuine desire to reorient foreign policy interests toward the Middle East; this, of course, is not anything new. On that note, I anticipate the most pronounced impact to be on Turkey-EU relations than Turkey's relationship with the United States or its standing within NATO. I would say it's possibly not the best outcome from the general U.S. standpoint.