Relationship between propaganda and public reexamined through new research
LAWRENCE — Government propaganda is generally viewed as a pyramid, with all the information coming from the top downward. But new research suggests the structure is more like a two-way street, with the message being shaped by both parties.
“In practice, a lot of people may not believe propaganda fully, but they take it seriously,” said Anton Shirikov, assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas.
His new paper titled “Rethinking Propaganda: How State Media Build Trust through Belief Affirmation” outlines how propaganda reinforces regime support and builds trust through identity-consistent messages. But the analysis also indicates that autocrats are more constrained by public opinion than previously thought. It appears in the Journal of Politics.
Shirikov said how in authoritarian regimes such as Vladimir Putin’s Russia, “Instead of persuasion or intimidation, propaganda can satisfy public demand for political ideas and narratives, crafting its message around regime supporters’ core beliefs.”
“We know there are autocratic regimes that are based mostly on fear and military rule, where they don’t really care about public opinion. But most do care. Autocrats like Putin care what people think because a lot of their power is in popularity and in public support,” he said.
This works in multiple ways. One is that support offers leverage over both allies and enemies, showing that Putin cannot easily be toppled because his popularity among the masses would make them upset if that happened. It also makes conditions easier for Putin because if he’s popular, people are more likely to accept what he’s doing, according to Shirikov.
Ironically, propaganda itself is rife with public misconceptions.
“People think it’s just repetition,” he said.
“For example, if the Kremlin wants people to believe Ukraine is a Nazi state, one might think that they just repeat that on TV every day, and then people start believing it. This is not exactly how it works — I don’t think repeating lies on partisan media works anywhere. Ultimately, it’s that people have strong preconceptions, and when propaganda can speak to these preconceptions, then it works.”
The model of the media that Putin’s Russia uses is copied from the U.S., Shirikov said. This is both in terms of the overall format presentation and by creating some semblance of a debate that implies a sense of different opinions.
He said, “Sometimes when I encounter very partisan media in America, I do recall Russia’s Channel One or other state channels that show a similar relationship with truth. I would call it ‘creatively interpreted.’”
However, Shirikov believes Russian propaganda often strives to have more basis in fact than American partisan media.
“Not that they don’t lie,” he said. “But they often try to find something they can present as evidence that ‘this actually happened.’”
He cited an example of Putin’s media declaring countries in Europe are dying economically because of sanctions against Russia. They support this by showing empty shelves in Germany.
“Of course, it’s not a representative store. It’s just some random store they found. But they actually went there. They made a video. They have something to present to viewers. Whereas low-quality partisan media in the U.S. often don’t care about that at all. They just make stuff up with no evidence to back it up,” he said.
A native of Russia, Shirikov is finishing his first semester at KU. His research investigates how propaganda helps authoritarian leaders maintain public support and undermine the influence of independent media. Before his doctoral studies, he worked as a journalist for independent media in his home country.
“I was really frustrated as a journalist by how many people were totally fine with state media being their main source of information. There was a lot more independent media back then, and they worked very hard to investigate the Kremlin, to talk about corruption, about the Russia-sponsored war in Donbas. Yet most people just didn’t care. And that was something that pushed me to move away from journalism and get into academia,” said Shirikov, who switched professions in 2015.
The professor is currently working on a book that expands on the intersection of media and propaganda.
“I will also be happy if people start thinking more about propaganda as something that can, in principle, provide people with value,” Shirikov said. “It provides some emotional value, some comfort. It’s not just pure manipulation.”